Managing Alaska's Coastal
Development: State Review of Federal

Oil and Gas Lease Sales
Outside of a thin three-mile strip ofAlaska's coast,all offshore oil
and gas production occurs on federal lands. Given the potential
for environmental harm and the economic change that development of these resources would entail,Alaska has a clear interest
in controllingthis development to the fullest extent possible. This
note argues thatfederal law provides the means by which the state
can ensure that production on federal lands will not circumvent
whatever safeguards Alaska feels are necessary. The note
concludes by offering a means by which Alaska can get involved
in the offshore development process as early as possible and
thereby can guarantee that its concerns will not be pushed aside
by the federal government.
I.

INTRODUcTION

On October 1, 1945, the United States Congress announced
that it "regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of
the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States,
subject to its jurisdiction and control."' This announcement,
known as the Truman Proclamation, came as a surprise to the
coastal states and territories, which traditionally believed that they
controlled the continental shelf 2 The Truman Proclamation was3
codified as part of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
establishing a zone of state control three miles seaward of the low
water mark along state coastlines. Everything seaward of this line
was deemed to be federal territory.4
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Despite the fact that the technology to exploit Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS") natural resources was unavailable in 1953, the
states were aware of the potential for development of the regions
off their shorelines, and they fought hard to keep those regions
under state control. State challenges to federal ownership of the
OCS were made both before and after the passage of the the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act. 5 The states were correct in assessing
the value of offshore resources-over 20,000 oil and gas wells have
been drilled in the OCS, and the United States government has
made more than eighty-seven billion dollars through lease sales and
royalty payments.6 Only recently has the federal government
begun to share revenues generated beyond the three-mile line with
coastal states. However, those states receive only twenty-seven
percent of the royalties earned from resource extraction in the zone
three to six miles off their coasts.7
Although they have lost the battle for OCS ownership, coastal
states continue to have reasons for attempting to affect its development. One important reason is environmental protection. In
January 1969, a well blow-out spilled 70,000 barrels of oil into the
Santa Barbara Channel, inundating the media with images of dying,
oil-soaked birds.' These pictures provoked such a hostile public
response that California was able to force Congress to impose a
moratorium on offshore leasing and development off its coast.9
Since then, the specter of oil spills has haunted both the oil
industry and the states whose environments are threatened.
Concern about oil spills in Alaska intensified in 1989 as a
result of the Exxon Valdez tragedy that spilled eleven million
barrels of oil into Prince William Sound.1" The Valdez disaster

5. See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504 (1985); United States v.
Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
6. Wiygul, supra note 2, at 81.
7. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
8. John K. Van de Kamp & John A. Saurenman, Outer ContinentalShelf Oil
and Gas Leasing: What Role for the States?, 14 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 73, 73 n.2
(1990).
9. Wiygul, supra note 2, at 82. Congressional moratoria are generally the
result of political pressure against petroleum production on the east and west
coasts. Today, Congress allows OCS development to proceed only in Alaska,
Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. Id. Of course, all states are free to allow
production to continue within their three-mile zone.
10. David P. Lewis, Note, The Limits of Liability: Can Alaska Oil Spill Victims
Recover Pure Economic Loss?, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 87, 87 (1993).
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caused a legislative response on both local and national levels, and
it led directly to the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.11
Alaska's concern about oil spills clearly extends to federal oil and
gas activities on the OCS as well as those on state lands.
Preventing oil spills, however, is not the only reason Alaska
has an interest in regulating OCS development.
Resource
production off the Alaska coast will put significant pressure on the
state's infrastructure as remote areas such as the North Slope
Borough develop. Additionally, drilling and oil transportation
could pose other environmental problems. For example, construction of undersea pipelines may disturb the migratory patterns of
endangered bowhead whales, while increased traffic near landbased facilities could alter the migration of other animals such as
caribou. Either of these possibilities would further disturb the
subsistence lifestyles of many Native Alaskan communities. Finally,
oil drilling on the OCS would interfere with the productivity of
other offshore resources. For example, the fishing industry could
be affected by hazards resulting from sustained drilling activity,
such as gear loss"2 and seabed degradation.
The Alaska state government is better able to address these
state-related issues than the federal government. The state
legislature is likely to be better informed about the multitude of
local issues that will inevitably arise, and is better equipped to
protect the rights of Alaskans against intrusions by the federal
government. Congress recognized as much with its inclusion of the3
state consistency doctrine in the Coastal Zone Management Act.
This note will examine the means by which Alaska can achieve
some level of control over resource development on the OCS off
its coast. Part II reviews the governing structure of federal lease
sales. Part III analyzes consistency determinations in some detail,
as these appear to be the primary means for Alaska to influence
OCS development. Part IV emphasizes the importance of the state
utilizing its power at the lease sale stage rather than later in the
process. Finally, this note concludes by making concrete recom-

11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. II 1990).
12. Gear loss occurs when devices such as trawl nets become entangled with
offshore petroleum facilities.
13. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1988). Under the consistency doctrine, all federal
OCS activities must be consistent with state coastal management programs. See
infra text accompanying note 37.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:2

mendations as to how the state can exert greater control over the
OCS.
II.

LAWS AFFECTING OFFSHORE OIL PRODUCTION IN ALASKA

A. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Federal activities of almost any sort outside of the three-mile
zone of state control on the OCS are governed by the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA")."4 Congress passed the

OCSLA with the explicit purpose of providing for the development
of the nation's submerged natural resources, with particular
emphasis on lessening American dependency on foreign energy
sources." However, Congress was clearly concerned with the
secondary effects of coastal development. Therefore, the OCSLA
enumerates several other considerations that must be balanced
against national energy goals during the development of the OCS,
including: (1) fair returns on oil and gas resources; (2) preservation
of competition; (3) protection of human, marine and coastal
environments; and (4) local and state governments' rights to be
involved in a process that will affect their jurisdictions.16
The OCSLA arranges the development of offshore resources
on federal lands by dividing the process into four distinct stages:
pre-leasing, lease sale, exploration and development." At each
stage, the Secretary of the Interior must review increasingly
detailed environmental information, and he or she retains the
power to halt the process at any time if such action would be
necessary to protect the environment. 8 Courts have used this
pyramidal structure to justify exceedingly lenient review of actions
by the Secretary at early stages of the process. 9
Lease sales are governed by 43 U.S.C. § 1337, which allows the
Secretary of the Interior to grant leases of submerged lands to the
highest bidder.2" Prior to the issuance of any lease, the Secretary

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (Supp. II 1990).
Id. § 1801.
Id. § 1802.
Id. §§ 1337, 1340, 1344, 1351.
Id. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i).

19. See, e.g., California ex reL Brown v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1317 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
20. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (1988). This section provides for several other
details of the lease, including the length of the lease, royalties, cancellation and
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must prepare an environmental impact statement and determine
that the lease is consistent with the coastal management program
of the affected state."' The lessee must provide further environmental reports explaining any planned exploration or development
activities once the lease is sold.' These reports must consider
such issues as the adequacy of clean-up facilities, the impact of
onshore support facilities, possible pollution caused by any
operation and "the direct affects on the offshore and onshore
environments."'
The OCSLA provides for a limited amount of state involvement during the OCS development process, even at the pre-lease
sale stage. The governors of affected states may submit recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior concerning the timing or
size and location of the lands in a proposed lease sale. 4 The
Secretary is required to accept the recommendations of a governor
upon determining that they "provide for a reasonable balance
between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of
the affected State."' The Secretary may also enter into cooperative agreements with affected states for any purpose consistent with
the OCSLA.26 Finally, the Secretary is required to make information regarding the lease available to affected states in order to
suspension of the lease, and the entitlement of the lessee to conduct exploration
and production, subject to the Secretary's approval of the planned activities. Id.
21. See Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983). The
authority for the state consistency determination comes from the Coastal Zone
Management Act. See infra text accompanying notes 36-53. The consistency
determination can take place only if the affected state has enacted a federally
approved coastal management program. Alaska's coastal management program
is based upon the Alaska Coastal Management Act of 1977, ALASKA STAT.
§§ 46.40.010-210, and received federal approval in 1979. See ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 6, §§ 50, 80 for regulations concerning the ACMP.
22. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 1351 (Supp. II 1990).
23. 30 C.F.R. § 250.34(3)(a)(1) (1992).
24. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(a) (1988).
25. Id. § 1345(c). While there is no clear statement of what constitutes a
"reasonable balance," one court has said that a recommendation must allow "oil
and gas to be 'developed in a manner which takes into consideration the Nation's
energy needs and also assures adequate protection to the renewable resources of
the OCS."' Massachusetts v. Clark, 594 F. Supp. 1373, 1384 (D. Mass. 1984)
(quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1801(14) (1982)).
26. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(e) (1988). Alaska has entered into such an agreement
under the authority provided for in this section and under the CZMA. Memorandum of Understanding Between Division of Policy Development and Planning and
U.S. Geological Survey (1980) (on file with the Alaska Law Review).
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assist them in p!anning for the onshore impact of OCS activities.27
This level of state involvement provides Alaska with the opportunity to influence the development of resources off its coast.'
However, the influence of the states over lease sales under the
OCSLA must not be overstated. The weak position of the states
was illustrated in a Ninth Circuit decision. In California v. Watt,29
California challenged a rejection of Governor Brown's recommendation that a number of tracts in the Santa Maria basin be deleted
from a proposed sale. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal
of the state's challenge, holding that although the Secretary perhaps
had not adequately balanced the interests of the residents of
California against those of the federal government, reversal was not
warranted under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review."
Similarly, in Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel,3 1 Alaskan

tribal villages and environmental groups attempted to enjoin a lease
sale off the northern coast of the Aleutian Islands. The Ninth
Circuit upheld Secretary Hodel's rejection of Governor Sheffield's
recommendations,32 citing the high level of deference accorded the
Secretary's decisions under the OCSLA. The court refused to
reevaluate the data used by the Secretary and noted that even if
the governor's proposals were found to be reasonable, it would not
imply that the Secretary's rejection of them was arbitrary and
capricious.33 One author has pointed out that "[t]he general
lesson to draw from these cases is that Section 19 [of the OCSLA]34 has some utility as a means of making the concerns of the
states known to Interior, but gives them no real power to enforce

27. 43 U.S.C. § 1352(b)(2) (1988).

28. See Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F.Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983). In
that case, Governor Sheffield used the comment power to recommend that certain
stipulations be entered in to the lease sale agreement regarding spill response and
pipelines. The Secretary made "substantial accommodations" to the concerns of
the Governor and included the requested stipulations.
29. 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Secretary
of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).

30. Id. at 1268-69.
31. 869 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988).
32. Governor Sheffield recommended that (1) the lease sale be delayed for
eight years and (2) all tracts within twenty-five miles of the Alaska peninsula be
deleted from the deal. Id. at 1188.
33. Id. at 1190.
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1345 (1988) (gubernatorial comment power).
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these concerns."35 Therefore, Alaska must look beyond the
OCSLA for authority if it wishes to assert substantial control over
OCS development.
B. The Coastal Zone Management Act
In 1972, Congress sought to implement a more rational
program of OCS development by coordinating agencies and
different levels of government on projects affecting the three-mile
coastal zone. This concern resulted 36in the passage of the Coastal
Zone Management Act ("CZMA").
The CZMA marked the beginning of a new era of shared
control of the OCS between the federal and state governments.
Section 307(c)(1) of the Act requires that
[e]ach Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone
that affects any land or water use or natural resource of the
coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner which is consistent
to the maximum extent practicable with the37 enforceable policies
of approved State management programs.

It has been said that "nowhere has more authority been delegated
to the states than under the [CZMA's] federal consistency
doctrine., 38 The state has the power to make an independent
review of any federal activity to determine whether the activity is
consistent with the state's coastal management program. 39 This
consistency determination is the basis of almost all of the state's
power to affect OCS development.4" However, to utilize this
power most effectively, the state must devise a detailed coastal
management plan, thereby providing a sounder basis for showing
a subsequent decision by Interior to be arbitrary and capricious.
The first case to address consistency review at the lease sale
stage under the CZMA was Secretary of the Interior v. California.41 There, California challenged a lease sale off Santa Barbara,
claiming that it was an activity "directly affecting" the coastal zone

35. Wiygul, supra note 2, at 75 (footnote added).
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1988).
37. Id. § 1456(c)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
38. Timothy Eichenburg, Federalism and Federal Consistency: The State
Perspective, 1 COASTAL ZONE 542 (1987).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3) (1988).
40. See part IILB., infra, for a detailed discussion of state consistency review.
41. 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
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and therefore subject to consistency review.42 The Supreme Court
held that lease sales did not directly affect the coastal zone and that
the states had no power under the consistency review power to
affect OCS development at the lease sale stage.43 The Court
made its decision despite legislative history and agency interpretations that clearly indicated that Congress had intended consistency
review to occur at the lease sale stage.44
In 1990, Congress acted to remedy this situation by enacting
the 1990 amendments to the CZMA. 45 The revised version of
CZMA § 307(c)(1) 46 leaves no doubt that lease sales are subject
to consistency review.47 However, the statutory change did not
invalidate all of the prior case law in this area. For example, in
California v. Watt,' the Ninth Circuit held that a determination
by the Secretary of the Interior that a lease sale was consistent with
a state's coastal management program was reviewable subject to
49
the presumption of regularity afforded to agency decisions.
After the 1990 Amendments, a federal district court in Louisiana
also deferred to the agency's decision." Although one court has

42. Id. The original version of CZMA § 307(c)(1) read: "Each Federal agency
conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone shall conduct
or support those activities in a manner which is, to the maximum extent
practicable, consistent with approved state management programs."

16 U.S.C.

§ 1456(c)(1) (1972) (emphasis added) (amended 1990). Thus, the state had to
claim that lease sales were such an activity in order to challenge the federal action.

This requirement was deleted by the 1990 CZMA Amendments.
43. Secretary of the Interior,464 U.S. at 330.
44. The Department of Justice had already issued an opinion that lease sale

activities were subject to state consistency review. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,142 (1979).
45. For an extended review of how the legislative history of the 1990 CZMA
Amendments indicates a congressional intent to overrule Secretary of the Interior,
see Jack H. Archer, Evolution of Major 1990 CZMA Amendments: Restoring
Federal Consistency and Protecting Coastal Water Quality, 1 TERR. SEA J. 191

(1991).
46. See supra text accompanying note 37.
47. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration noted as much,

stating that the 1990 amendments "overturn[ed] the Supreme Court's 1984 decision
in Secretary of the Intiriorv. California,in which the Court held that OCS oil and
gas lease sales were not subject to Federal consistency." 57 Fed. Reg. 31,106
(1992).
48. 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Secretary
of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).

49. Id. at 1264.
50. Louisiana v. Lujan, 777 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. La. 1991). This was the first
court challenge to a lease sale under the 1990 CZMA. Louisiana sought to enjoin
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held that the federal agency bears the burden of proving that an
OCS activity complies with the local coastal management program,51 it appears that a challenge to a federal consistency
determination of a lease sale would likely fail because of the high
level of deference to the Secretary of Interior. One author has
said:
In the case of federal activity such as a leasing decision, the
courts have generally held, in effect, that the federal agency
ultimately decides whether the activity is consistent "to the
maximum extent practicable" with the state coastal zone
program. This means that once the Department of the Interior
decides that a lease sale is consistent, the burden is on the
coastal state to show that the Interior's decision is wrong. Thus,
in a judicial challenge, the federal agency's decision will be
protected by the federal Administrative Procedure Act's (APA)
deferential review standards. As a practical matter, this means
that it will be very difficult for the adjacent state to challenge the
federal agency's determination that its action is consistent.5'
In order to avoid having their challenges to federal consistency
determinations defeated by the APA's "arbitrary and capricious"
standard, states that wish to exercise control over the OCS must
clarify their interests to the Secretary of the Interior in their coastal
management programs. If a state concern is addressed by a
federally approved coastal management program, the Secretary will
have no choice but to follow that state's wishes unless "the
Secretary finds ...that each activity ... is consistent with the

objectives of this chapter or is otherwise necessary in the interest
of national security."'53 Should the Secretary make such a determination, the state will have no power to control the proposed
activity. However, the Secretary will not always be able to make
a credible determination of that sort. As a result, states can best
affect federal OCS activities by enacting detailed coastal management programs to form the basis for consistency review.

the lease sale on the basis that the Secretary's determination of consistency with
Louisiana's coastal management plan was invalid. After losing its motion for a
preliminary injunction, Louisiana withdrew the suit.
51. Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 576 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983).
52. Wiygul, supra note 2, at 160.
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(iii) (1988).
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C. The Alaska Coastal Management Program
The Alaska Coastal Management Act of 19775' created the
Alaska Coastal Management Plan ("ACMP"). The objective of the
ACMP is to encourage the development of Alaska's coastal
resources while protecting "significant historic, cultural, natural and
aesthetic values ...

within the coastal area.""5

The Coastal

Management Act also established the Alaska Coastal Policy
Council for the purpose of reviewing and updating the ACMP.56
The Alaska Coastal Policy Council must develop statewide policies
consistent with the objectives of the Act and promulgate procedural
regulations governing interaction with federal agencies.57 Furthermore, local governments and certain specially organized coastal
resource service areas are required to develop district coastal
management programs for state approval and integration into the
ACMP
The combination of local coastal management plans
with statewide policies is designed to ensure that issues unique to
local areas may be incorporated into the state interests as a whole.
The Alaska Supreme Court has held that "[t]he regulations...
provide that a state agency may authorize uses or activities in the
coastal area under its statutory authority only if 'the agency finds
that the use or activity is consistent with the applicable district
program and the standards contained in this chapter."' 59 Thus,
Alaska has the opportunity to influence offshore activities by
means of its ACMP regulations.
The ACMP currently includes regulations implementing the
specific standards applicable to coastal activities, several of which
are relevant to OCS hydrocarbon production.' For example,
agencies must identify both known and potential geophysical
hazard areas.6 Development may not take place in these areas
until certain loss-prevention measures have been taken.62 Agencies are also required to identify areas suitable for the location of
54. 1977 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 84.
55. ALASKA STAT. § 46A0.020(5) (1991).
56. Id. § 46.40.010.
57. Id. § 46.40.040.
58. Id. §§ 46.40.030, 46.40.120.
59. Hammond v. North Slope Borough, 645 P.2d 750, 761 (Alaska 1982)
(quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 80.010(b) (Jan. 1993)).
60. See generally ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 80 (Jan. 1993).
61. Id. § 80.050.
62. Id.
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"energy facilities," subject to a number of specific considerations. 6 3
Possible transportation routes,64 the impact on subsistence usage66

of coastal areas and resources,65 and preservation of habitats

must also be considered under the ACMP. Air, land and water

quality standards are also adopted by reference into the ACMP.67
Finally, agencies and districts must identify archaeological sites
important to the study of the area's history.'
In Trustees for Alaska v. State Departmentof NaturalResources

(Trustees II),69 the Alaska Supreme Court established standards
for applying some of these regulations within the context of a state
lease sale. The case involved a challenge to the state's findings that

a proposed lease sale in Camden Bay ("Sale 50") was consistent
with the ACMP and that it was in the state's best interest." The

Trustees contended that Sale 50 failed to comply with ACMP
standards regarding geophysical hazards, archaeological resources
and transportation.7 1 Citing Trustees I,7' the Court held that the

63. Id. § 80.070. The term "major energy facility" is defined by § 80.900(22)
to include almost anything having to do with energy production, including rigs,
pipelines, oil terminals and port developments. The considerations include
minimalization of risk to biologically productive or vulnerable habitats, allowance
for the free passage of wildlife and location of facilities in areas of least biological
activity. Id. § 80.070(11)-(13).
64. Id. § 80.080.
65. Id. § 80.120.
66. Id. § 80.130(d). "Offshore areas" are included generally in "habitats" for
the purposes of this regulation. Id. § 80.130(a)(1). Activities that do not maintain
or enhance natural habitats may be allowed only if there is "significant public
need," no "feasible prudent alternative" exists to meet the need and "all feasible
and prudent steps to maximize conformance" with this standard are taken. Id.
§ 80.130(d).
In a recent decision, a Superior court held, among other things, that there is
a general significant public need for oil and gas production, that feasible
alternatives to such production do not exist outside of the coastal zone, and that
lease terms and stipulations may be sufficient to maximize conformance with the
ACMP. Ninilchik v. Noah, No. 3KN-93-1174 Civil, slip op. at 14-19 (Alaska
Super. Ct., Oct. 17, 1994). To the extent that this ruling is upheld on appeal, the
viability of the habitats standard may be completely undermined.
67. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 80.140 (Supp. July 1994).
68. Id. § 80.150 (Jan. 1993).
69. 851 P.2d 1340 (Alaska 1993).
70. Trustees II dealt only with the issue of ACMP consistency. The court did
not review the best-interest determination on substantive grounds as it had done
in Trustees L
71. Trustees II, 851 P.2d at 1342-43.
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Department of Natural Resources "had the duty to determine
whether73the sale of oil and gas leases was consistent with the
ACvP.

With respect to the geophysical hazard standard, the Department of Natural Resources contended that its identification of the
entire Sale 50 area as a geophysical hazard area was sufficient to
comply with section 80.050 of title 6 of the Alaska Administrative
Code, so long as development would not be approved until lossprevention measures had been provided for.74 However, the court
held that because detailed knowledge of the area was available,
"indiscriminate and conclusory identification of an entire sale area
as a geophysical hazard area does not suffice ... ."' The court

further noted that consideration of geophysical hazards at the
development stage would entail examination on a lease-site-bylease-site basis, which could lead to a failure to appreciate the
cumulative effect of several operations in a given area.76 The
court determined that a segmented approach to review would
increase the risk that activities permitted in the early phases of
development might attain an inertia that would compel the
Department of Natural Resources to permit unsound activities in
the future.77 The court also emphasized the need for the review

of cumulative environmental impacts as early in the development
process as possible.78
The Trustees also prevailed on their contention that the
Department of Natural Resources failed to apply the archaeological
standard properly. The Department of Natural Resources argued
that it had justifiably delegated its duty to identify archaeological
sites to the Sale 50 lessees on the bases that (1) the existence of
such sites was highly unlikely in the Sale 50 area, (2) the Sale 50
leases stipulated that the lessees would report any discoveries, and

72. Trustees for Alaska v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 795 P.2d 805

(Alaska 1990). There, the court held that the sale was subject to consistency
review, but remanded the decision for a new review by the Office of Management
and Budget rather than by the Department of Natural Resources. Id. at 812.

Because of this procedural remand, the court did not examine the substance of
whether the sale was consistent with the ACMP.

73. Trustees II, 851 P.2d at 1344.
74. Id. at 1343.
75. Id. at 1344.
76. Id.

77. Id. (citing Trustees for Alaska v. Gorsuch, 835 P.2d 1239 (Alaska 1992)).
78. Id. at 1344 n.8.

OCS LEASE SALE REVIEW

1994]

389

(3) development of the lease sites would be subject to an independent determination.79 The court disagreed, holding that the
ACMP requires the identification of known archaeological sites at
the lease sale stage."0 The court reiterated the fact that individual
lease site review could have the effect of undervaluing the
cumulative importance of an area, and that the lessees would be
operating under a conflict of interest concerning the reporting of
sites which they discovered.8 '
Despite the court's rulings that geophysical hazards and
archeological sites must be examined at the lease sale stage, it also
held that the Department of Natural Resources' failure to examine
the possible effects of transporting oil from the Sale 50 site did not
violate the ACMP transportation standard.' 2 The regulation
provides:
(a) Transportation and utility routes and facilities in the coastal
area must be sited, designed and constructed so as to be

compatible with district programs.
(b) Transportation and utility routes and facilities must be sited
inland from beaches and shorelines unless the route or facility is
water-dependent or no feasible and prudent inland alternative
exists to meet the public need for the route or facility.'
The court reasoned that "[u]ntil exploration is proposed and, in all
likelihood, until and unless a commercially exploitable discovery is
made, there will be no occasion for siting, designing or constructing
transportation and utility routes."' Thus, the standard had not
been violated because there was no proposed exploration.
The court's willingness to allow postponed review of potential
transportation routes is arbitrary given the court's holding that
examination of geophysical hazards and archaeological sites must
take place upon review of the lease sale. Just as there could be
archaeological sites so valuable as to make a given lease sale
inherently inconsistent with the ACMP, there could also be a site
to which no reasonable transportation route consistent with the
ACMP could be envisioned. Furthermore, the court's cursory
review of the transportation issue is anomalous when compared to
the emphasis placed on transportation in Trustees L Despite these

79. Id. at 1345.
80. Id. at 1346.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6,
Trustees II, 851 P.2d at 1346.

§ 80.080 (Jan. 1993).
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apparent inconsistencies it remains, under Trustees 11, that the
ACMP transportation standard cannot be violated at the lease sale
stage.
Recently, the Alaska legislature amended the ACMP by
codifying the "phasing" of consistency determinations.' This
amendment allows an agency charged with deciding whether a
given activity is consistent with the ACMP (in the case of oil and
gas leasing, the Department of Natural Resources) to review only
the current phase of the activity if
(1) at the time the proposed use or activity is initiated, there is
insufficient information to evaluate and render a consistency
determination for the entirety of the proposed use or activity;
(2) the proposed use or activity is capable of proceeding in
discrete phases based upon developing information obtained in
the course of a phase; and
(3) each subsequent phase of the proposed use or activity is
subject to discretion to implement alternative decisions based
upon the developing information.'
Furthermore, the agency must ensure that subsequent phases will
be subject to independent consistency determinations "based on
applicable statutes and regulations, the facts that are material and
known to the state ...and the reasonably foreseeable, significant

effects of the use or activity for which the consistency determination is sought."' Because no cases have been decided under this
procedure, it is unclear whether the legislature has changed existing
law or merely codified a process which was in use prior to
enactment. However, by postponing review, this statute lends
support to the Alaska Supreme Court's treatment of the transportation standard in Trustees II, and may even undermine the court's
holding with respect to its decision to apply the geophysical and
archeological standards to the lease sale stage.
D. Other Laws Affecting OCS Lease Sales
Several other laws are applicable to OCS lease sales. Three of
these, the National Environmental Policy Act," the Endangered
Species Act89 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act," give the
85. Act of May 9, 1994, ch. 38, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 308 § 8 (to be codified
at ALASKA STAT. § 46.40.094).
86. Id.
87. Letter from Bruce M. Bothelo, Attorney General, to Walter J. Hickel,
Governor of Alaska 3 (May 8, 1994) (on file with the Alaska Law Review).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1988).
89. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (Supp. V 1993).
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states little influence over OCS activities. The National Environmental Policy Act generally provides that actions such as an OCS
lease sale must be accompanied by an environmental impact
statement, which at the very least should have the effect of
providing valuable information to the affected states." However,
courts have chosen to excuse the Department of the Interior from
having to produce detailed analyses at the lease-sale stage, largely
because of the availability of further review at the later stages of
the OCS development process. 2 Under the Endangered Species
Act, states have only a comment power,93 and they have no role
at all under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Similarly, none
of the remaining statutes that could in some way affect OCS
activities seem to grant any power to the states at the lease sale
stage. 4
III.

CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION IN ALASKA

A. Federal Consistency Determination
Before a given tract of the OCS is offered for leasing, the
federal government undergoes a planning procedure known as the
Area Evaluation and Decision Process.95 Under the current fiveyear plan,96 there are three steps which the Minerals Management
Service ("MMS") must take before a lease sale. The first step is
the Information Gathering and Evaluation Process, during which
the MMS reviews the area for potential OCS development.97 The

90. Id. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1988).
92. See, e.g, North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. den., 493
U.S. 873 (1989). For a summary of how the courts have greatly weakened the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act with respect to OCS
activities, see Van de Kamp & Saurenman, supra note 8, at 93-98.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii) (1988).
94. For a complete listing of the applicable laws, see Elizabeth J. Kerttula &
Gabrielle E. LaRoche, ALASKA OUTER

CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS

LEASE SALE REVIEW AND COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT: REPORT TO COASTAL

J (June 1993) [hereinafter OCS LEASE SALE REVIEW].
95. Id. at 28-31.
96. The Department of the Interior coordinates lease sales under five-year
plans. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988). The current operative plan runs from 19921997.
97. OCS LEASE SALE REVIEW, supra note 94, at 29.
POLICY COUNCIL App.
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states have no power over the activity at this stage. After an area
has been evaluated and a decision has been made to proceed, the
MMS begins the Planning and Consultation Process.98 During this
stage, the IMS interacts with state and local governments, largely
for the purpose of creating a "consensus" on whether to proceed
with development. The states, however, have no real power to
affect a decision made by the MMS at this stage, except perhaps
through less formal means such as political pressure.
The states' first real opportunity to interact with the MMS
comes during the Analysis of Decision Options Process. At the
beginning of the lease sale process, the MMS sends the affected
states a proposed notice of sale, alerting state and local governments to the exact location and size of the planned lease.99 At
this stage, the MMS also must prepare an environmental impact
statement pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act,1' °
consult with the governors of affected states as required by the
OCSLA, 10 ' and consult other agencies under the Endangered
Species Act."° Most importantly, though, the MMS must prepare
and submit a determination of the lease sale's consistency with the
affected state's coastal management program.103
This complex process is best illustrated by reference to a
specific lease sale. On November 16, 1990, Alaska received a
proposed notice of sale from the MMS for Beaufort Sea Lease Sale
124 ("Sale 124").1" The Sale 124 area was composed of large
portions of the continental shelf in the northeastern Chukchi Sea
and the Beaufort Sea that contained an estimated 900 million
barrels of hydrocarbon resources. 105 The MMS also requested the
governor's comments pursuant to the OCSLA, which he submitted
prior to the state consistency determination. The MMS published
its consistency determination on February 8, 1991, after finding the

98. Id.

99. Id.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1988).
101. 43 U.S.C. § 1352(b)(2) (1988).

102. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2) (1988).
103. 15 C.F.R. § 930.40 (1992).
104. This was the first OCS lease sale to be conducted after the enactment of
the 1990 Amendments to the CZMA, which had taken effect only eleven days
earlier.
105. MMS CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION FOR BEAUFORT SEA OCS LEASE
SALE 124,3 (Feb. 8, 1991) (on file with the Alaska Law Review) [hereinafter MMS
CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION].
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lease sale to be consistent with the ACMP. °6 The state issued its

final consistency determination on April 30, agreeing with the
MMS's finding that Sale 124 complied with the requirements of the
ACMP.'
Finally, on June 26 the MMS conducted the lease
sale.'3
The MMS consistency determination is worth reviewing in
detail. The MMS noted that while the lease sale was composed of
seemingly innocuous activities such as submission and evaluation of
bids, if a lease were made, the lessee would acquire certain rights,
including the right to conduct "preliminary activities."'0 9 Furthermore, the MMS noted that "[p]release decisions are based on an
evaluation of events that could follow the lease sale.""' Therefore, the federal consistency determination would be based upon
much of the same material used in preparing the environmental
impact statement required by the National Environmental Policy
Act, which included estimates of exploitable resources, exploration
and development plans and environmental impact.
Based on previous drilling in the Beaufort Sea, the MMS
assumed that exploratory drilling would last five years (1992-1996)
with production running from 2000-2018. Furthermore, assuming
that oil would be both discovered and produced, the agency
calculated a sixty-eight percent chance that one or more spills of at
least one thousand barrels of oil would occur during the productive
life of the lease sale area."' Finally, the MMS estimated that the
oil would be transported approximately 600 miles by pipeline,
connecting the productive wells with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.
Onshore support for the OCS activities would be centered in
Prudhoe Bay."1
In assessing the likely impact of offshore activities, the MMS
made further assumptions concerning the exact nature of the
activities. For instance, in concluding that the community of
Nuiqsut would suffer a high level of disturbance, the MMS assumed
that the landfall of the pipeline would occur at Point Thompson.

106. Id.
107. Office of the Governor, CONCLUSIVE CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION:
OCS BEAUFORT SEA LEASE SALE 124, April 30, 1991.
108. MMS CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION, supra note 105, at 17.
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id.
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This location is in the immediate vicinity of Flaxman Island, the
primary site for Nuiqsut subsistence whaling activities. Construction in that area would probably drive away bowhead whales for
the duration of the construction period. Such a result would be a
serious blow to the Nuiqsut, particularly if the whales were driven
to areas beyond the range of their hunters. Onshore pipeline
moderate
construction activity was also found to have a probable
3
disruptive effect on caribou migration patterns."
Having made these assumptions, the MMS then proceeded to
analyze the ACMP and the North Slope Borough Coastal Management Plan in light of the anticipated activities during the term of
the lease."4 Wherever possible, the MMS assumed compliance
with state and local standards."5 For instance, because the North
Slope Borough Coastal Management Plan limits support facilities
for tankers," 6 the MMS assumed the use of pipelines for transportation and pointed out that lease stipulations require pipelines
under most circumstances." 7 Furthermore, offshore pipelines
were assumed to continue inland immediately after crossing the
beach in order to comply with section 80.080 of title 6 of the
Alaska Administrative Code, which requires that transportation
facilities be situated inland from shorelines and beaches. 18
In order to determine that Sale 124 was consistent with the
ACMP and North Slope Borough Coastal Management Plan
subsistence standards, the MMS was forced to assume that certain
stipulations would be incorporated into the lease. Of particular
force was the agency's conclusion that construction activities near
Flaxman Island would disrupt subsistence bowhead whaling.
Stipulation 6 of Sale 124 (Substinence Whaling and Other Sub-

113. Id. at 4.
114. Id. at 8-21.

115. Because these and other MMS assumptions deal primarily with the
anticipated effects of production rather than of the lease sale itself, they probably
do not fall within the scope of a phased consistency determination concerning a
lease sale under the new ALASKA STAT. § 46A0.094(c). See supra text accompanying notes 85-87. As a result, such a forward looking assessment of consequences
may no longer be required during a consistency determination.
116. § 2.4.5.1[g].
117. MMS CONSISTENcY DETERMINATION, supra note 105, at 12.
118. Id. The MMS was even able to project the location and length of the
pipeline-about 275 miles offshore and 325 miles inland were estimated to be
necessary to move oil from the production platforms to the Trans-Alaska pipeline.
Id. at 3.
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stinence Activities) requires that the lessee contact affected native
communities as well as the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission
and make reasonable efforts to ensure that OCS activity does not
conflict with subsistence activities." 9 The MMS decided that this
stipulation was sufficient to ensure that Sale 124 was "consistent
with subsistence policies to the maximum extent practicable." '
The MMS chose not to assume a seasonal drilling restriction to
protect the whales during the hunting season. This was done for
several reasons, including the fact that Alaska did not request such
a restriction and that the Department of Commerce had found
previously that any advantages accruing to subsistence communities
and/or endangered species through seasonal restrictions would be
outweighed by the substantial cost the lessee would bear.'
Ultimately, the MMS concluded that Sale 124 was consistent with
the ACMP.
B. State Consistency Determination Review
As noted above, following the enactment of the 1990 Amendments to the CZMA, OCS lease sales have required state consistency review. This review is the first real opportunity for coastal states
to attack a federal decision to proceed with unwanted development
of the OCS off their shorelines. It is critical that a state wishing to
exercise control over OCS development enact a detailed coastal
management plan in order to be able to challenge a federal
consistency determination at this stage.
State consistency review begins when it receives the MMS's
consistency determination. Under Alaska regulations governing the
review process, there is an initial twenty-five day period from the
time when the state agency receives the MMS determination,
during which it may request additional information from the person
seeking to engage in OCS activity." The Department of Governmental Coordination can hold up the review process until such
information is received."2 The state may then issue a conclusive
determination based on,the received comments within forty-five
days. However, the federal action proponent, state resource

119. Id. app. A at 6.
120. Id. at 14.
121. Id. at 15.
122. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 50.070(g) (Jan. 1993).

123. See generally id. § 50; OCS LEASE SALE REviEW, supra note 94, at 11.
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' a proagencies or any affected coastal district may "elevate"124
posed decision for further review by state resource agency
directors." State regulations provide for a total of three levels
of review, and because each level of review must be completed
within fifteen days, the entire process may be completed within the
ninety days provided in the CZMA."6 Alaska also provides for
appeal by coastal districts or coastal citizens to the Alaska Coastal
Policy Council.2 7 However, due to practical considerations, such
a review would probably not be available within the federally
imposed time frame.
State rejection of a federal consistency determination must be
accompanied by reasons explaining the disagreement."
If the
parties cannot resolve their differences, they may go through a
mediation process. 9 The availability of mediation does not
exclude other remedies, nor is it a prerequisite for judicial action. 3 ' If the state cannot settle its dispute through mediation,
and chooses to go through the court system, it will run up against
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard established in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe."' Perhaps states might do better
in mediation, but it seems likely that the same high standard would
stand in their way. Therefore, regardless of whether the state
anticipates mediation, it is imperative that states make sure that
their positions are properly supported by legislation and regulations
when they disagree with a federal consistency determination. The
existence of detailed, supporting legislation and regulations

124. "Elevated" effectively means "appealed" during the consistency review
process.
125. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 50.0700) (Jan. 1993).

126. The CZMA actually only provides a 60 day window for state consistency
review during the 90 day period between the issuance of its consistency
determination and the time at which it can take action. 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.39-.40.
There remains some debate over whether Alaska would be able to utilize the full
90 days or whether the MMS could limit the state to 60 days (thus eliminating two
potential review levels). However, because the three-level review process is part
of the federally approved ACMP, it appears that the federal government has
implicitly guaranteed Alaska the use of the full 90 days.
127. ALASKA STAT. § 46.40.100 (1991).

128. 15 C.F.R. § 930.42.
129. Id. § 930.43.
130. Id. § 930.116.
131. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Courts have utilized that standard to uphold decisions
made by the Secretary of the Interior in Californiav. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.
1982) and Louisiana v. Lujan 777 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. La. 1991).
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increases the chances that the Secretary of the Interior's rejection
of the state's consistency findings will be found arbitrary and
capricious.
IV. ALASKA'S ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE OCS
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Significance of the Lease Sale Stage
If Alaska wishes to exert any real influence over the OCS
development process, it should do so as early as possible, preferably at the lease sale stage. However, courts have attempted to
weaken the role of the states at this early stage, relying on five
main propositions to achieve this goal:
(1) No physical impacts of importance can follow the sale
without first being approved by the Secretary of the Interior;
(2) The successful lessees do not acquire any right to proceed
to exploration and development but only a priority for submitting plans of exploration and development and production plans;
(3) At the exploration, development, and production stages, all
environmental statutes apply, including [the National Environmental Policy Act];
(4) At the exploration, development, and production stages, the
Secretary retains the authority to suspend or cancel leases if the
environmental impacts of development are too great; and
(5) At exploration and development stages, the consistency
provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act allow states a
substantial voice in what activities will occur."'
However, the logic of the various courts that have attempted
to minimize the importance of the lease sale stage is fundamentally
flawed. The lease sale stage is absolutely critical to OCS development. In Trustees II, the Alaska Supreme Court noted the
importance of the lease sale:
[E]nvironmentally protective purposes require that at the time
[the Department of Natural Resources] reviews any... permit
application it consider the probable cumulative impact of all
anticipated activities which will be a part of [the project in
question], whether or not the activities are part of the permit
under review. If [the Department of Natural Resources]
determines that the cumulative impact is problematic, the
problems must be resolved before the initial permit is approved.'33
A.

132. Van de Kamp & Saurenman, supra note 8, at 99 (footnotes omitted).
133. 851 P.2d 1340, 1344 n.8 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Trustees for Alaska v.
Gorsuch, 835 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Alaska 1992)).
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Moreover, the states are no longer powerless to have an early
effect on the process. When the 1990 Amendments to the CZMA
were passed, the states' power at the lease sale stage increased
substantially because it became clear that the lease sales are subject
to state consistency review.
The paramount importance of the lease sale stage emanates
from the fact that it is the only opportunity to review the entire
lease sale area as a whole. Review at the exploration or development stages is limited to those individual lease sites within the lease
area which are part of the current exploration or development plan.
Deferring consideration of environmental issues until only individual lease sites are reviewed "may tend to mask appreciation of any
cumulative environmental threat that would otherwise be apparent
if [the Department of Natural Resources] began with a detailed and
comprehensive identification of those hazards."' 34 Thus, individualized site review cannot effectively protect the Alaskan coastal
region as a whole.
Furthermore, the Secretary of Interior's power to suspend or
cancel a lease does not provide any real safeguards to the state's
interests. Once an OCS area has been leased, a certain amount of
inertia tends to drive the area toward development. First, the
Department of the Interior has a financial interest in not cancelling
a lease-the OCSLA provides that in the event of a cancellation,
a lessee is entitled to compensation equal to the lesser of anticipated profits or the difference between the lessee's revenues to date
and his expenditures. 35 More importantly the Department of the
Interior has never cancelled any lease for any reason. As one
commentator points out, "for Interior the benefits associated with
protecting the environment have never been valuable enough to
'
justify incurring the high cost of cancelling a lease agreement."136
Overall, the courts' reliance on the later stages of review is
unwarranted. In addition to the fact that issues such as cumulative
effects cannot be adequately addressed beyond the lease sale stage,
the regulations applicable to the post-lease sale phases of OCS
development only address the question of what form exploration
and production should take, as opposed to whether they should
occur at all. 37 Also, state consistency review at later stages is
134. Id. at 1344.
135. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(C) (1988).
136. Van de Kamp & Saurenman, supra note 8, at 104.
137. Id. at 105.
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severely limited by the Department of the Interior's position that
environmental impact statements are not required for exploration
plans.13 This has the effect of denying the state the chance to
examine all possible environmental effects. Finally, state denials of
exploration or development plans will not be upheld unless the
'
state provides to the lessee a "reasonable alternative."139
This
prevents a state from completely blocking undesirable exploration
or development. Therefore, if a state wishes to exercise any real
control over the OCS development process, it must do so at the
lease sale stage.
B. A Case Study: Alaska's Oil and Gas Transportation Standard
The importance of the lease sale stage to Alaska is exemplified
by the single issue of oil transportation from OCS facilities to
inland points. Under Trustees 11, Alaska may not include a review
of the method of oil transportation at the lease sale consistency
review. 40 Therefore, Alaska's transportation standard cannot
serve to determine which lease sales are consistent with the ACMP
and which are not. Still, the very existence of the transportation
standard is evidence that the state believes it to be an integral part
of the ACMP. Its inapplicability at the lease sale stage is an issue
that should be addressed by the state so as to ensure that federal
lease sales are conducted in a manner consistent with Alaska's
requirements for oil transportation.
The hazards accompanying oil transportation methods pose
cumulative risks that might go unnoticed if each lease site were
allowed to determine its transportation plan separately. For
instance, a lease site generating a low level of tanker activity might
be allowed to begin production under the ACMP. But, if tanker
activity for other sites in the same leasing area are not taken into
account, factors such as the cumulative probability of collision and
the total oil tonnage being transported might not be fully appreciated.
One example of the extremely harmful effects of cumulative
risks can be seen in Louisiana. Most of the 20,000 OCS wells
drilled since the beginning of offshore oil production are in the
western Gulf of Mexico. A large number of these wells are off the
138. Id. at 108-09.

139. Id. at 110. The right to appeal to the Secretary of Commerce is established
by 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
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shores of Louisiana, which depends so heavily on the oil industry
that it has been reluctant to attack OCS development until recently.
Today, Louisiana suffers from an astounding rate of coastal
erosion-it loses an area approximately equal to that of the District
of Columbia (fifty square miles) each year."' Although no single
pipeline could possibly have caused this level of damage, the
cumulative effect of all the pipelines is an environmental disaster.
Perhaps Alaska's coastlines are not as susceptible to erosion as
Louisiana's marsh, but there is no guarantee that local problems
unique to Alaska would not arise on a similar scale.
Alaska must prevent such a possibility by amending its
transportation standard so that it applies at all stages of the OCS
process. One way to do this would be to amend section 80.080 of
title 6 of the Alaska Administrative Code to specifically require
that transportation analysis be conducted on the basis of whatever
information and reasonable projections are available at the time of
the consistency determination.142 There has been some concern
that there is not enough information to make a determination
about transportation routes until actual drill sites have been
established.'
However, as a matter of course, the MMS makes
reasonable assumptions about transportation routes when producing both their environmental impact statement and their consistency determination.'" If there is a genuine lack of information, the
Department of Natural Resources could simply adopt the projections of the MMS for the purpose of making its own consistency
determination.
Concern about whether the state would be "locked in" to a
determination under the transportation standard is also unfounded.
Determination under other ACMP standards does not preclude a
later determination that reverses the first one. For instance, if an
OCS lessee made an important archaeological find that warranted

141. Wiygul, supra note 2, at 140, n. 292.
142. Along these same lines, Alaska could adopt a general amendment to
section 80 of title 6 of the Alaska Administrative Code which requires all ACMP
reviews to supplement factual information with reasonable projections about
factual data. The ACMP could at the same time reserve the right to alter initial
determinations which were based on projections as actual data becomes available.
143. Indeed, this very concern appears to have driven the ruling in Trustees II,
where the court stated that "until and unless a commercially exploitable discovery
is made, there will be no occasion for siting, designing or constructing transportation and utility routes." Trustees II, 851 P.2d at 1346.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 111-21.

1994]

OCS LEASE SALE REVIEW

an end to OCS activity in that area, no one could reasonably claim
that the Department of Natural Resources' previous determination
to allow development would prevent review of the same area.
Similarly, if data revealing unforeseen hazards (or simply more
serious hazards than originally anticipated) relating to transportation became available after an initial consistency determination,
there is no reason to believe that it would be allowed to continue.
Alaska should explicitly reserve the right to reevaluate the
consistency of an activity in light of any new data or interpretations
of data that could reasonably be expected to reveal a violation of
the ACMP.
Alaska should also try to be more specific about what the
ACMP requires from its transportation standard. Other state
coastal management programs address transportation much more
specifically. For example, California explicitly prefers pipelines
over tankering. 145 Section 80.080 of title 6 of the Alaska Administrative Code does contain specific references to the siting of
onshore facilities and compliance with district programs. However,
it could easily be amended to state a preferred method of transportation. It could also be used to address issues that are uniquely
Alaskan. For example, the state might wish to limit or eliminate
tankering in broken-ice conditions. Such specificity is desirable
because it would give the state much firmer ground on which to
stand in either a challenge to its consistency determination or in a
court battle with the Secretary of the Interior. Today, even if the
state were to feel that tankering was a possibility for a given lease
area, and wished to limit it to non-broken-ice conditions, the
Secretary could simply decide that such activity is not a violation
of the ACMP and then hide behind the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard. But, if the ACMP expressly forbade tankering in those
conditions, such action by the Secretary might actually appear
either arbitrary or capricious.
V.

CONCLUSION

The availability of consistency review provides Alaska with a
unique opportunity to exercise real influence over the development
of the natural resources off its shoreline. Although the state can
never fully control these resources, it can ensure that oil and gas
production on the OCS does not run afoul of the standards which

145. CAL. PUB. REs. § 30265(b) (1990).
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it has set for other offshore activities by revising the ACMP. State
control in this area is especially important to Alaska because of the
scope of potential problems and opportunities that could arise as
a result of OCS petroleum development. Only the states can fully
understand the implications of offshore activities to local environments and economies. Alaska, with its unique environment and
natural wealth, is in a position to steer OCS development toward
a controlled growth that can help meet the energy needs of the
nation as a whole without undue risk to one of the nation's
treasures-the Alaskan landscape.
Alaska can accomplish this by taking a few necessary steps.
First and foremost, it must revise the ACMP to ensure that it
applies to all stages of OCS development, particularly the lease sale
stage. An ACMP that does not apply at the critical early stages is
ineffective in light of considerations such as the inertia behind
taking a leased area through to production. If any given standard
within the ACMP does not apply to the lease sale stage (such as
transportation), it must be revised so that it does. Furthermore, the
phasing system'46 should be revised in order to make it clear that
it is not intended to allow phases of OCS activities to proceed
without examining the consequences of the activity as a whole.
Phasing should grant flexibility to an agency by allowing it to focus
on a smaller time frame, not hamstring it by forcing it to look only
at presently available facts. This could easily be accomplished by
amending the ACMP regulatory definitions to include MMS
projections and other possible outcomes of the activity among the
"reasonably foreseeable, significant effects" under Alaska Statutes
section 46.40.094(b)(2)(C). A detailed ACMP that applies to the
early phases of offshore development can be used either to
challenge a federal consistency determination directly or as a
negotiating tool, as was the case with the review of Sale 124. The
ACMP must become the primary means for Alaska to exert power
over OCS development.
Alaska should also continue to use some of the less reliable
means of influencing the process, such as the gubernatorial
comment power under the OCSLA and its power to issue consistency determinations. As previously discussed, these methods
should not be relied upon to produce desired results, as the
Secretary of the Interior's determinations are subject to a very high

146. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
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level of deference. However, these methods have been successful
in the past as a means of incorporating limited concerns into a
given lease, and they should continue to be used as a kind of
testing ground for future ACMP regulations.
There is enormous wealth off Alaska's coast. This wealth
includes not only petroleum, but also resources such as fish, tourism
and natural beauty. The development of any offshore resource also
has substantial effects on the land. Regardless of whether these
effects are negative (such as oil spills or interference with subsistence lifestyles) or positive (such as more jobs and increased
wealth), Alaska should have a say in whether these effects will be
allowed. It does. Consistency review under the CZMA gives the
state the means to play a role in regulating federal activities off its
shore. Alaska must grasp this opportunity to the greatest degree
possible. Using the ACMP through CZMA consistency review is
Alaska's key to shaping its own future.
M. David Kurtz

